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On amending Executive Order 12866:
Good governance or regulatory usurpation?
by Sally Katzen
The following essay is based on testimony delivered February 13 before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law and the House Science
and Technology Subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight.

During the last six years, there has been a slow but steady
change in the process by which regulations are developed and
issued—speciﬁcally, in the balance of authority between the
federal regulatory agencies and the Ofﬁce of Management and
Budget. Recently, the Bush Administration has again restricted
agency discretion and made it more difﬁcult for the federal
agencies to do the job that Congress has delegated to them.
The implications of these changes for administrative law and
regulatory practice are very signiﬁcant.
On January 18, 2007, the Bush Administration released two
documents. One was expected; the other was not. While I
disagree with several of the choices made in the “Final Bulletin
for Good Guidance Practices,” I recognize that a case can be
made that there is a need for such a bulletin. On the other
hand, there is no apparent need for Executive Order 13422,
further amending Executive Order 12866. Regrettably, none
of the plausible explanations for its issuance is at all convincing.
As I discuss below, there are at least three aspects of the new
executive order that warrant attention:
v the way it was done—without any consultation or explanation;
v the context in which it was done—coming on the heels of
OMB’s imposing [of] multiple mandates/requirements on the
agencies when they are developing regulations; and
v the effect it will have and the message it sends to the
agencies—it will be even more difﬁcult for agencies to do their
jobs because regulations are disfavored in this administration.
To put the most recent executive order in perspective, a
little history may be helpful. The ﬁrst steps towards centralized
review of rulemaking were taken in the 1970s by Presidents
Nixon, Ford, and Carter, each of whom had an ad hoc process
for selectively reviewing agency rulemakings: President
Nixon’s was called the Quality of Life Review; President Ford’s
was focused on the agency’s Inﬂationary Impact Analysis that

accompanied the proposed regulation; and President Carter’s
was through the Regulatory Analysis Review Group. Those
rulemakings that were considered signiﬁcant were reviewed by
an inter-agency group, which then contributed their critiques
(often strongly inﬂuenced by economists) to the rulemaking
record.
In 1981, President Reagan took a signiﬁcant additional
step in issuing Executive Order 12291. That order formalized
a process that called for the review of all executive branch
agency rulemakings—at the initial and the ﬁnal stages—under
speciﬁed standards for approval. The ofﬁce that President
Reagan chose to conduct the review was the Ofﬁce of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), established by the
Congress for other purposes under the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1980. Unless OIRA approved the draft notice of
proposed rulemaking and the draft ﬁnal rule, the agency could
not issue its regulation.
Executive Order 12291 was highly controversial, provoking
three principal complaints. One was that the executive order
was unabashedly intended to bring about regulatory relief—not
reform—relief for the business community from the burdens
of regulation. Second, the order placed enormous reliance on
(and reﬂected unequivocal faith in) cost/beneﬁt analysis, with
an emphasis on the cost side of the equation. Third, the process
was, by design, not transparent; indeed, the mantra was “leave
no ﬁngerprints,” with the result that disfavored regulations were
sent to OMB and disappeared into a big black hole. The critics
of Executive Order 12291, including the then Democratic
majority members of Congress, expressed serious and deep
concerns about the executive order, raising separation of
powers arguments, the perceived bias against regulations, and
the lack of openness and accountability of the process.
When President Clinton took ofﬁce and I was conﬁrmed by
the Senate as the Administrator of OIRA, my ﬁrst assignment
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was to evaluate Executive Order 12291 in light of the 12 years
of experience under Presidents Reagan and Bush, and help draft
a new executive order that would preserve the strengths of the
previous executive order but correct the ﬂaws that had made
the process so controversial. President Clinton would retain
centralized review of executive branch agency rulemakings,
but the development and the tone of the executive order he would
sign (Executive Order 12866) was to be very different.
I was told that Executive Order 12291 was drafted in the
White House (Boyden Gray and Jim Miller take credit for the
document) and presented, after President Reagan had signed it,
as a fait accompli to the agencies. The protests from the agencies
were declared moot. We took a different route, consulting and
sharing drafts with the agencies, public interest groups, industry
groups, Congressional staffers, and state and local government
representatives. When all their comments were considered
and changes made to the working draft, we again consulted
and shared our new drafts with all the groups, and again took
comments. More changes were made, and where comments
were not accepted, we explained the basis for our decisions.
The tenor of Executive Order 12866 was also quite different
from Executive Order 12291. As noted above, Executive
Order 12866 retained centralized review of rulemakings, but
also reafﬁrmed the primacy of the agencies to which Congress
had delegated the authority to regulate (Preamble). Executive
Order 12866 also limited OIRA review to “signiﬁcant regulations”—those with a likely substantial effect on the economy,
on the environment, on public health or safety, etc. or those
raising novel policy issues (Section 6(b)(1))—leaving to the
agencies the responsibility for carrying out the principles of the
executive order on the vast majority (roughly 85 percent) of
their regulations.
Executive Order 12866 continued to require agencies to
assess the consequences of their proposals and to quantify and
monetize both the costs and the beneﬁts to the extent feasible.
(Section 1(a)) But it explicitly recognized that some costs
and some beneﬁts cannot be quantiﬁed or monetized but are
“nevertheless essential to consider” (Section 1(a)). I believe it
was Einstein who had a sign in his ofﬁce at Princeton to the
effect that “not everything that can be counted counts, and not
everything that counts can be counted.”
While Executive Order 12291 required agencies to set their
regulatory priorities “taking into account the conditions of
the particular industries affected by the regulations [and] the
condition of the national economy” (Section 2 (e)), Executive
92
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Order 12866 instructed agencies to consider “the degree and
nature of the risks posed by various substances and activities
within its jurisdiction” (Section 1(b)(4)), and it added to the
list of relevant considerations for determining if a proposed
regulation qualiﬁed as “signiﬁcant” not only an adverse effect on
the economy or a sector of the economy, but also “productivity,
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety or
State, local, or tribal governments or communities” (Section
3(f)).
There were other signiﬁcant differences between Executive
Order 12291 and Executive Order 12866, including those
relating to the timeliness of review and the transparency of the
process, but for present purposes, the key to the difference
was that President Clinton was focused on a process for better
decision-making and hence better decisions and not a codiﬁcation of a regulatory philosophy or ideology. Centralized review
was seen as a valid exercise of presidential authority, facilitating
political accountability (the president takes the credit and
gets the blame for what his agencies decide) and to enhance
regulatory efﬁcacy (that is, decisions that take into account
the multitude of disciplines and the multitude of perspectives
that can and should be brought to bear in solving problems in
our complex and interdependent society). But whatever one’s
view of centralized review of agency rulemakings, Executive
Order 12866 was—on its face and by intent—a charter for
good government, without any predetermination of outcomes.
The neutrality of the process was essential. President Clinton

But whatever one’s view of centralized review
of agency rulemakings, Executive Order 12866
was—on its face and by intent—
a charter for good government . . .
viewed regulations as perhaps the “single most critical . . .
vehicle to achieve his domestic policy goals” (Kagan, 114
Harvard Law Review 2245, 2281-82 [2001]), and he spoke often
of the salutary effects of regulations on the nation’s quality of
life and how regulations were part of the solution to perceived
problems. But the executive order was not skewed to achieve
a pro-regulatory result. The regulations would be debated on
their merits, not preordained by the process through which
they were developed and issued.
When George W. Bush became President in January 2001,

his philosophy was decidedly anti-regulatory. I know that his
advisors considered whether to change Executive Order 12866
and they concluded that it was not necessary to accomplish
their agenda. Indeed, President Bush’s OMB director instructed
the agencies to scrupulously adhere to the principles and
procedures of Executive Order 12866 and its implementing
guidelines (OMB M-01-23, June 19, 2001). The only changes
to the executive order came two years into President Bush’s
ﬁrst term, and the changes were limited to transferring the
roles assigned to the Vice President to the chief of staff or the
OMB director (Executive Order 13258).
Almost ﬁve years later, President Bush signed Executive
Order 13422, further amending Executive Order 12866. So far
as I am aware, there was no consultation and no explanation of
the problems under the existing executive order that prompted
these amendments, or whether the amendments would have a
salutary effect on whatever problems existed, or whether the
amendments would have unintended consequences that should
be considered. Press statements issued after the fact do not
make for good government.
Second, the new executive order comes in the course of
a steady and unwavering effort to consolidate authority in
OMB and further restrict agency autonomy and discretion. On

. . . there was no consultation and no explanation
of the problems under the existing executive order
that prompted these amendments . . .
February 22, 2002, OMB issued its Information Quality Act
(IQA) Guidelines (67 Federal Register 8452). The IQA itself was
three paragraphs attached to a more than 700-page Treasury and
General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
with no hearings, no ﬂoor debate, and no committee reports.
Its objective was “to ensure the quality, objectivity, utility, and
integrity of information disseminated to the public.” OMB took
up the assignment with a vigor and determination that was
remarkable. OMB’s government-wide guidelines created a new
construct: Now, there would be “information” and “inﬂuential
information” and different (more stringent standards) would
apply to the higher tiers. OMB also required the agencies to
issue their own guidelines (subject to OMB approval); establish
administrative mechanisms allowing people or entities to seek
the correction of information they believe does not comply

with these guidelines; and report periodically to OMB on the
number and nature of these complaints. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce thought this “would have a revolutionary impact on
the regulatory process”—keeping the agencies from relying on
data that industry thought was questionable.
Then came OMB’s Proposed Draft Peer Review Standards
for Regulatory Science (August 29, 2003), in which OMB
attempted to establish uniform government-wide standards
for peer review of scientiﬁc information used in the regulatory
process. Peer review is generally considered the gold standard
for scientists.Yet leading scientiﬁc organizations were highly
critical of what OMB was trying to do and how it was doing it,
and they were joined by citizen advocacy groups and former
government ofﬁcials. They argued that the proposed standards
were unduly prescriptive, unbalanced (in favor of industry), and
introduced a new layer of OMB review of scientiﬁc or technical
studies used in developing regulations. The reaction was so
strong and so adverse that OMB substantially revised its draft
Bulletin to make it appreciably less prescriptive and restrictive, and in fact OMB resubmitted it in draft form for further
comments before ﬁnalizing the revised Bulletin.
On March 2, 2004, OMB replaced a 1996 “best practices”
memorandum with Circular A-4, setting forth instructions
for the federal agencies to follow in developing the regulatory
analyses that accompany signiﬁcant draft notices of proposed
rulemaking and draft ﬁnal rules. The Circular, almost 50-pages
single spaced, includes a detailed discussion of the dos and
don’ts of virtually every aspect of the documentation that
is needed to justify a regulatory proposal. While the term
“guidance” is used, agencies that depart from the terms of the
Circular do so at their peril (or more precisely, at the peril of
their regulatory proposal).
Then came the OMB Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin
(January 9, 2006), providing technical guidance for risk
assessments produced by the federal government. There were
six standards speciﬁed for all risk assessments and a seventh
standard, consisting of ﬁve parts, for risk assessments related to
regulatory analysis. In addition, using the terminology from the
IQA Guidance, OMB laid out special standards for “Inﬂuential
Risk Assessments” relating to reproducibility, comparisons with
other results, presentation of numerical estimates, characterizing uncertainty, characterizing results, characterizing variability, characterizing human health effects, discussing scientiﬁc
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literature, and addressing signiﬁcant comments. Agency
comments raised a number of very speciﬁc problems and such
general concerns as that OMB was inappropriately intervening
into the scientiﬁc underpinnings of regulatory proposals. OMB
asked the National Academies of Scientists (NAS) to comment
on the draft Bulletin. The NAS panel (on which I served) found
the Bulletin “fundamentally ﬂawed” and recommended that it be
withdrawn.
Then, on January 18, 2007, OMB issued its ﬁnal bulletin
on “Agency Good Guidance Practices.” Agencies are increasingly using guidance documents to inform the public and to
provide direction to their staff regarding agency policy on
the interpretation or enforcement of their regulations. While
guidance documents—by deﬁnition—do not have the force and
effect of law, this trend has sparked concern by commentators,
including scholars and the courts. In response, the bulletin
sets forth the policies and procedures agencies must follow
for the “development, issuance, and use” of such documents. It
calls for internal agency review and increased public participation—all to the good. In addition, however, the bulletin also
imposes speciﬁed “standard elements” for signiﬁcant guidance
documents; provides instructions as to the organization of
agency websites containing signiﬁcant guidance documents;
requires agencies to develop procedures (and designate an
agency ofﬁcial/ofﬁce) so that the public can complain about
signiﬁcant guidance documents and seek their modiﬁcation
or rescission; and extends OIRA review to include signiﬁcant
guidance documents. I do not believe it is an overstatement
to say that the effect of the bulletin is to convert signiﬁcant
guidance documents into legislative rules, subject to all the
requirements of Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, even though the terms of that section explicitly exempt
guidance documents from its scope. To the extent that the
bulletin makes the issuance of guidance documents much
more burdensome and time consuming for the agencies, it will
undoubtedly result in a decrease of their use. That may well
have unintended unfortunate consequences, because regulated
entities often ask for, and appreciate receiving, clariﬁcation of
their responsibilities under the law, as well as protection from
haphazard enforcement of the law, by agency staff. This is quite
a record. While each step can be justiﬁed as helping to produce
better regulatory decisions, the cumulative effect is overwhelming. Requirements are piled on requirements, which are
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piled on requirements that the agencies must satisfy before they
can issue regulations (and now, signiﬁcant guidance documents)
that Congress authorized (indeed, often instructed) them to
issue. And OMB has not requested, nor has the Congress in
recent years appropriated, additional resources for the agencies
to carry out OMB’s ever increasing demands. As agencies must
do more with less, the result is that fewer regulations can be
issued—which is exactly what the business community has been
calling on this administration to do.
It is in this context that Executive Order 13422, further
amending Executive Order 12866, is released. Until the
bulletin on guidance documents, OIRA extended its inﬂuence

. . . may well have unintended unfortunate consequences, because regulated entities often ask
for, and appreciate receiving, clariﬁcation of their
responsibilities under the law, as well as protection
from haphazard enforcement of the law, . . .
throughout the Executive Branch without any amendments
to Executive Order 12866. As detailed above, OMB issued
circulars and bulletins covering a wide variety of subjects,
virtually all of which were quite prescriptive (and often quite
burdensome) in nature. OMB circulars and bulletins do not
have the same status as an executive order, but they are treated
as if they did by the federal agencies. Why then did OMB draft
and the President sign Executive Order 13422?
One indication of a possible answer is that while Executive
Order 13422 in effect codiﬁes the bulletin on guidance
documents, it does not pick up and codify the earlier
pronouncements on data quality, peer review, regulatory impact
analyses, or even risk assessment principles. It may be that it
was thought necessary to amend Executive Order 12866 for
guidance documents because Executive Order 12866 was
written to apply only where the agencies undertook regulatory
actions that had the force and effect of law. But it is unlikely
that the agencies would balk at submitting signiﬁcant guidance
documents to OIRA if there were an OMB bulletin instructing
them to do so, and since neither executive orders nor circulars
or bulletins are judicially reviewable, it is also unlikely that
anyone could successfully challenge in court an agency’s
decision to submit a signiﬁcant guidance document to OIRA.

Perhaps more revealing of the reason(s) for Executive
Order 13422 is that the changes are not limited to guidance
documents but go beyond what has been done in the past. First,
Executive Order 12866 had established as the ﬁrst principle of
regulation that:
“Each agency shall identify the problem that it
intends to address (including, where applicable, the
failure of private markets or public institutions that
warrant new agency action) as well as assess the
signiﬁcance of that problem.”

Executive Order 13422 amends Executive Order 12866 to
state instead:
“Each agency shall identify in writing the speciﬁc
market failure (such as externalities, market power,
lack of information) or other speciﬁc problem that
it intends to address (including, where applicable,
the failures of public institutions) that warrant new
agency action, as well as assess the signiﬁcance of
that problem, to enable assessment of whether any new
regulation is warranted.”

By giving special emphasis to market failures as the source
of a problem warranting a new regulation, the administration is saying that not all problems are equally deserving of
attention; those caused by market failures are in a favored class
and possibly the only class warranting new regulations. This
could be read as a throwback to the “market-can-cure-almostanything” approach, which is the litany of opponents of regulation; in fact, history has proven them wrong—there are many

Now, there is an explicit politicalization
of the process . . . and most signiﬁcantly,
no accountability.
areas of our society where there are serious social or economic
problems—e.g., civil rights—that are not caused by market
failures and that can be ameliorated by regulation. Second, the
new executive order amends Section 4 of Executive Order
12866, which relates to the regulatory planning process and
speciﬁcally references the Uniﬁed Regulatory Agenda prepared
annually to inform the public about the various proposals
under consideration at the agencies. The original executive
order instructed each agency to also prepare a regulatory plan
that identiﬁes the most important regulatory actions that the
agency reasonably expects to issue in proposed or ﬁnal form
in that ﬁscal year. Section 4, unlike the rest of the executive

order, applies not only to executive branch agencies, but also
to independent regulatory commissions, such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal
Reserve Board. It is not without signiﬁcance that the new
executive order uses Section 4 to impose an additional restraint
on the agencies:
“Unless speciﬁcally authorized by the head of
the agency, no rulemaking shall commence nor
be included on the plan without the approval of
the agency’s regulatory policy ofﬁce . . .”

This language should be read in conjunction with an
amendment to Section 6(a)(2) that speciﬁes that the agency’s
regulatory policy ofﬁcer must be “one of the agency’s presidential appointees.” Executive Order 12866 had provided
that the agency head was to designate the agency’s regulatory
policy ofﬁcer, with the only condition that the designee was to
report to the agency head. The original executive order further
provided that the regulatory policy ofﬁcer was to “be involved
at every stage of the regulatory process . . .”—in other words,
a hands-on job. Now, there is an explicit politicalization of the
process; a “sign-off,” not a hands-on, assignment; and, most
signiﬁcantly, no accountability. The newly appointed ofﬁcer is
not required to be subject to Senate conﬁrmation, nor is the
person required to report to a Senate-conﬁrmed appointee.
The other changes to Section 4 are also troubling. As
amended, the agencies must now include with the regulatory
plan the:
“agency’s best estimate of the combined
aggregate costs and beneﬁts of all its regulations
planned for that calendar year . . .”

Very few would dispute that the regulatory plan has been
notoriously unreliable as an indicator of what an agency is
likely to accomplish in any given time frame; it is not unusual
for regulations that are not included in the plan to be issued
should circumstances warrant, nor is it unusual for regulations
included in the plan with speciﬁc dates for various milestones
to languish year after year without getting any closer to ﬁnal
form. In any event, the requirement to aggregate the costs and
beneﬁts of all the regulations included in the plan for that year is
very curious. We know that costs and beneﬁts can be estimated
(at least within a range) at the notice stage because the agency
will have settled on one or more options for its proposal.
But to try to estimate either costs or beneﬁts before there is
any notice, that is, before the agency has made even tentative
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decisions, is like trying to price a new house before there is
even an option on the land and before there are any architect’s
plans. The numbers may be interesting, but hardly realistic, and
to aggregate such numbers would likely do little to inform the
public but could do much to inﬂame the opponents of regulation. This would not be the ﬁrst time that large numbers that
have virtually no relation to reality have driven the debate on
regulation—e.g., the $1.1 trillion estimate of the annual costs
of regulations that is frequently cited by opponents of regulation, even though every objective critique of the study that
produced that number concludes that it not only overstates, but
in fact grossly distorts, the truth about the costs of regulation.
The only other plausible explanation for this amendment to the
executive order it that it is the ﬁrst step toward implementing
a regulatory budget. In my view, the concept of a regulatory
budget is deeply ﬂawed, but it should be debated on the merits
and not come in through the back door of an executive order
justiﬁed on other grounds.
There is also a gratuitous poke at the agencies in the
amendment to Section 4(C). The original executive order
instructed the agencies to provide a “summary of the legal basis”
for each action in the regulatory plan, “including whether any
aspect of the action is required by statute or court order.” The
new amendment adds to the previous language the clause, “and
speciﬁc citation to such statute, order, or other legal authority.”
It may appear to be trivial to add this requirement, but by the
same token, why is it necessary to impose such a requirement?
As noted above, I am not aware of any consultation about
either the merits of any of the amendments or the perception
that may attach to the cumulative effect of those amendments.
Therefore, I do not know whether the agencies have, for
example, been proposing regulations based on problems caused
by something other than market failure which OMB does not
consider an appropriate basis for a regulation; whether senior
civil servants at the agencies have been sending proposed
regulations to OMB that run contrary to the wishes of the
political appointees at those agencies; or whether agencies have
been misrepresenting what applicable statutes or court orders
require.
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If not, then there is little, if any, need for these amendments,
other than to send a signal that the bar is being raised; that
OMB is deciding the rules of the road; and that those rules are
cast so as to increase the I’s that must be dotted and the T’s that
must be crossed. In other words, the message is that agencies
should not be doing the job that Congress has delegated to
them. This is not a neutral process. If the Bush Administration
does not like some or all agency proposed regulations, they can
debate them on the merits. But the executive order should not
become a codiﬁcation of an anti-regulatory manifesto. This is
not good government.

